Frameworks for Analyzing the Effects of Risk and Environmental Regulations on Productivity by Viscusi, W. Kip
Vanderbilt University Law School
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1983
Frameworks for Analyzing the Effects of Risk and
Environmental Regulations on Productivity
W. Kip Viscusi
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact
mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
Recommended Citation
W. Kip Viscusi, Frameworks for Analyzing the Effects of Risk and Environmental Regulations on Productivity, 73 American Economic
Association. 793 (1983)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/76
Frameworks for Analyzing the Effects of Risk and 
Environmental Regulations on Productivity 
By W. KiP VIsCusI* 
Although regulatory agencies have pro- 
mulgated health, safety, and environmental 
regulations largely on the basis of their pre- 
sumed benefits, the adverse economic effects 
of these policies are becoming an increas- 
ingly prominent concern. A series of studies 
has linked these regulations to the productiv- 
ity slowdown, inflation, and unemployment.' 
Significant economic effects of this type 
should be expected since the present value of 
the costs associated with major risk and en- 
vironmental regulations proposed between 
1975 and 1980 was $332.2-$846.5 billion.2 
These cost impacts are both quite large and 
highly variable. My concern in this paper is 
with how both the level of these costs and 
their uncertainty affect productivity.3 
The existence of a negative relationship 
between the regulatory burden and capital 
investments, and consequently productivity, 
is not controversial. A conventional model of 
this type is developed in Section I. If, how- 
ever, these regulations change over time and 
firms' investment decisions are irreversible, 
there will be additional distortions, as shown 
in Section II. In Section III, I show that 
uncertainty regarding these regulatory 
changes exacerbates the adverse productivity 
effects even for risk-neutral firms. 
I. Regulatory Impacts with Reversible 
Investments 
If firms' investments are completely re- 
versible, we can treat the firm as if it were 
renting capital on a period-by-period basis. 
This can be done using either a single period 
model, or, in a multiperiod context, by as- 
suming that the firm is myopic. In this sec- 
tion, I develop a fairly conventional model of 
this type to establish a point of reference for 
the subsequent results. Consider firms with 
two choice variables, the output level q and 
the quality level z, which will be scaled 
without loss of generality so that z is in the 
interval [0, 1], where higher values of z repre- 
sent higher quality levels. For risk regula- 
tions, the value of 1 - z represents the risk 
level per unit of output, such as the product 
failure probability or the injury rate per 
worker.4 For environmental situations, 1 - z 
can be viewed as the level of pollution per 
unit of output. 
The firm sells its output at a price v, and 
incurs production costs C(q), where C(q) > 
0, C'> 0, and C"> 0. Raising the quality 
level z is also costly, with the unit cost of 
producing quality z being given by G(z), 
where G(z) > 0, G'> 0, and G" > 0. Finally, 
firms are penalized x per unit of risk or 
pollution, so that the overall regulatory 
penalty is xq(l - z). The value of x repre- 
sents the total quality-related penalty, in- 
cluding rewards transmitted through market 
forces, but for concreteness I will treat the 
entire value of x as a policy parameter. If x 
reflects the value society places on each unit 
of quality, the regulatory policy will lead to 
an efficient outcome. The financial incen- 
tives imposed by workers' compensation sys- 
*Professor and Director, Center for Study of Busi- 
ness Regulation, Fuqua School of Business, Duke Uni- 
versity, Durham, NC 27706. This research was sup- 
ported in part by the Center for Study of Business 
Regulation. 
'These studies include Edward Denison (1978), 
Robert Haveman and Gregory Christainsen (1980) 
Marvin Kosters (1980), Paul MacAvoy (1979), Peter 
Pashigian (1981), and Paul Portney (1980). 
21 present this estimate in my 1983 study. 
3The role of regulatory uncertainty is often stressed 
by businessmen. As George P. Shultz observed, it intro- 
duces "a real wild card in investment decisions" (1980, 
p. 14). 
4In the case of job safety, one can easily modify the 
formulation below so that the firm picks the number of 
workers L rather than the output level q. 
793 
794 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER 1983 
tems or by proposed pollution tax policies 
best fit this structure. The model is also 
applicable to standards policies for which the 
penalties are linked to the extent of noncom- 
plicance once we reinterpret z as the degree 
of regulatory compliance.5 
Firms consequently select the level of q 
and z to maximize profits a o, or they 
(1) 
Max7T0 = vq - C(q)-qG(z)-xq(l - z), 
q, z 
yielding first-order conditions that reduce to6 
(2) C'=v-G(z)-x(l-z); 
(3) G'= x. 
For given quality level z, the regulation 
lowers the marginal benefits of production 
(or raises the marginal costs if one rearranges 
equation (2)), lowering the optimal output 
level. As equation (3) implies, the optimal 
quality level is set where its unit cost equals 
the regulatory penalty x. Finally, more strin- 
gent regulatory penalties will raise the overall 
quality level and depress output, as 
az/ax = l/G" > 0 
and aq/ax= -(l-z)/C"<0. 
II. Irreversible Decisions and Changes 
in Regulatory Policies 
If there are no impediments to changes in 
the firm's decisions, shifts in regulatory 
policies can be assessed using a one-period 
model as in Section I. Firms usually have 
much more limited discretion. Modifications 
in plant capacity, particularly in the down- 
ward direction, are typically quite costly due 
to the specialized nature of the capital stock, 
transactions costs involved in its resale, and 
the absence of a strong resale market. Simi- 
larly, once a firm has complied with risk and 
environmental regulations by, for example, 
installing a ventilation system to control 
hazardous fumes, the costs of compliance 
represent a sunk cost that cannot be readily 
recovered. 
Although the degree of inflexibility spans 
a continuum of possibilities, both in the up- 
ward and downward directions, I will focus 
on irreversibilities, where there is complete 
downward inflexibility in the enterprise's de- 
cision. Under this formulation, which was 
introduced by Kenneth Arrow (1968), the 
firm cannot reduce past capital investments, 
but it is free to augment these investments. 
This asymmetric approach is intended to be 
an approximation to the greater difficulties 
associated with decreasing past investments. 
While these investments may not be char- 
acterized by complete downward inflexibil- 
ity, as the transactions costs of disinvestment 
increase, the results approach those under 
strict irreversibility. 
Consider firms making decisions in a two- 
period model. Since in a single period, C(q) 
and G(z) represented the capital stock rental 
costs for one period, I will treat the role of 
irreversibility as making the first-period 
choice of q and z tantamount to a rental 
commitment that it cannot reduce.7 If we 
denote the two periods by subscripts i, where 
i = 1,2, the irreversibility assumption is that 
q2 ? q1 and Z2 > Zl Once an enterprise se- 
lects an output or quality level, it cannot re- 
duce it. 
A. Increasing Regulatory Stringency 
Suppose that firms are aware that the 
regulatory penalty will rise from x in period 
1 to x* in period 2, where x* > x. Regulatory 
policies that are phased in over several years 
have this character, as policymakers attempt 
5The only additional complication is that corner 
solutions play a more important role in the case of 
standards. For firms that choose complete compliance, 
the penalty term involving z drops out of the analysis, 
but the unit cost terms remain, where an optimizing firm 
will set z at the minimal level to ensure compliance in 
this instance. 
6The second-order conditions are also satisfied since 
0T? < ?0 qTs < 0, and 0 ?7qT7?_(qTO72 = G qC > O. 
7In a two-period model, this approach gives much 
more realistic results than examining actual capital in- 
vestments since investments in the first period will have 
a longer useful life. In addition, as in the case of Arrow's 
analysis (p. 5), I will abstract from the influence of 
depreciation since it plays no essential role. 
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to ease the adjustment burdens on the af- 
fected industries. Increasing the regulatory 
penalty will enhance the attractiveness of 
quality investments and will diminish the 
incentive to make capacity investments by 
raising the regulatory burden per unit of 
output. Since the firm cannot reduce its out- 
put level, it will remain at whatever level is 
selected in period 1, or 
(4) q2 = q I 
An optimizing firm will, however, raise z in 
the second period. The cost functions remain 
the same as before, but I will sometimes use 
the notation Gi to denote G(zi), and simi- 
larly C1 for C(qi). 
I will follow the usual dynamic pro- 
gramming approach of considering the deci- 
sions in the second period, given the first- 
period choices, and then work backwards to 
analyze the optimal first-period choices. The 
value of z2 is picked to maximize the profits 
I* in the second period, or 




(5) G2 x 
This equation, which is the second-period 
analogue of equation (3), indicates the opti- 
mal z2 level as a function of x*. Equation (5) 
thus implicitly defines a function Z(x*), 
which gives the optimal value of z2 as a 
function of x*, where Z'> 0. It is note- 
worthy that z2 depends only on x* and not 
on any other parameters or on any decisions 
in period 1. The optimal decisions in period 
2 are defined by equations (4) and (5). 
The task in period 1 is to maximize dis- 
counted expected profits IT, where the dis- 
count factor /3 is the inverse of one plus the 
interest rate. The values of qI and zI are 
selected to 
Max' = vq1-C(ql)-q,G(zl)-xql(1 - zl) 
ql, z, 
, D rvq - C(l) qX () x*ql l -. Z 
leading to first-order conditions that can be 
rewritten as 
(6) GI = x; 
(7) Cl = v 
Gl + x(l-zl)+f8G2 + /x*(l-Z) 
1+13 
As regulations become more stringent, ide- 
ally firms would like to expand their quality 
investment and diminish their capacity in- 
vestment. The increase in the quality invest- 
ment is feasible, as firms select zi on a myopic 
basis in each period (equations (5) and (6)) 
based on the regulatory penalty and margin- 
al investment costs. These quality invest- 
ments are independent of the output level so 
that the first-order conditions are not mutu- 
ally dependent; the zi values affect capacity, 
but there is no reverse linkage. Since capac- 
ity investments cannot be diminished, there 
is no additional investment in period 2, and 
the capacity level for both periods is selected 
in period 1 to satisfy equation (7). 
The fundamental concern here is how the 
resulting capacity investment levels compare 
with those under the reversible cases. Be- 
cause of the recursive nature of the results 
(i.e., the zi influence q1 but are not affected 
by it), this relationship hinges only on the 
capacity investment first-order conditions. 
The condition that the terms on the right 
side of equation (2) exceed the right side of 
equation (7) reduces to 
G(z(x))+ x(I - z(x)) 
< G (Z(x* x*l - Z(x*)) H, 
or showing that the quality-related costs per 
unit of output are greater in situations in 
which x is increased to x* than in one-period 
problems. To prove that H is increasing in x 
differentiate and apply the envelope theo- 
rem, yielding 
(8) dH/dx* = 1-Z > O. 
The prospect of tighter regulations depresses 
the value of ql, compared with the reversible 
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case, as the expression on the right-hand side 
of equation (2) always exceeds the compara- 
ble terms in equation (7).8 
Upon total differentiation of equations (6) 
and (7), it can be shown that 
aZI1/a8 = aZI/aX* = 0, 
aql/a,8 < O, and aql/ax* < O. 
The policy shift in period 2 does not alter zI, 
but it does depress the optimal output level. 
An enterprise facing a schedule of increas- 
ingly stringent regulations will reduce its ini- 
tial output level and be myopic in its quality 
investments. Increasing the discount factor 
places a greater weight on these second- 
period choices, leading to a reduction in the 
output level. 
B. Decreasing Regulatory Stringency 
When regulations are loosened rather than 
tightened, there are many similarities in the 
technical aspects of the analysis, but some 
significant differences in the nature of the 
results. If the penalty falls from x to x * in 
period 2, where x > x*, the firm cannot re- 
duce z, so that z2 = Z1, but it can increase its 
output level. It will do this in period 2 to 
maximize second-period profits ST *, or 
Max7T* = vq2 - C(q2)- q2G(zl) 
q2 
- x*q2(1 -Z) 
yielding 
(9) C2= v- GI -x*(l -zl). 
Equation (9) implictly defines the optimal 
q2 as a function of x * and z1, where 
aq2/ax* < 0; 
and aq2/aZI= (x*-G')/C2 <0. 
This relationship will be denoted by 
Q(x*, zl). The effect of z1 on q2 involves two 
competing effects. I will show below that the 
marginal penalty x* per unit of quality is 
smaller than the increased unit cost of qual- 
ity G' at the optimal zl. This gap arises since 
the firm will overinvest in zI in period 1 
relative to the quality investment it would 
have chosen if the penalty were always x . 
As a result, the high quality investment com- 
mitment from period 1 depresses output in 
period 2 since the marginal costs imposed by 
z1 exceed the marginal reduction in regula- 
tory penalties in period 2. 
The decision in period 1 is to 
MaxT** 
ql,z, 
= vql - C(qj)-qIG(zl)-xql(- zl) 
+ ,8 [vQ - C(Q)- QG(zl)- x*Q(1 - zj)], 
leading to the first-order conditions 
(10) 7qr**=0=v-C l-GI-x(I-zl); 
(11) 7Tz** = 0 =-qjG' + xql 
+/3Q(x*- G). 
Equation (10) is equivalent to the results for 
the myopic case in equation (2), for fixed 
values of quality zI. Comparing equations (9) 
and (10), it is clear that as the regulatory 
penalty is loosened from x to x *, the incen- 
tive to expand output in period 2 is increased 
since the only terms that change will be the 
choice variable q2 (through C2) and the regu- 
latory penalty per unit of output, which falls 
from x(I - zl) to x*(I - z1). 
Rewriting equation (11) in terms of the 
marginal investment cost yields 
(12) G' = (xqI +jfx*Q)/(qI +j8Q) <x, 
since x * < x. Compared to the myopic qual- 
ity choice in equation (3), the firm always 
underinvests in quality if the regulation will 
be loosened. This effect arises from a desire 
to prevent having overinvested in quality 
from the standpoint of the second period's 
regulatory policy in a situation in which in- 
vestment decisions are irreversible. 
8This result also implies that in the case of corner 
solutions in which the quality level is 1, there will be no 
effect of more stringent regulations on either the output 
or quality level since I - z equals zero once quality hits 
the maximum level. 
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Assuming the second-order conditions are 
fulfilled,9 the effect of a relaxation of the 
regulatory policy can be summarized as fol- 
lows: 
dx> ' a '?; d '?; a 
Higher values of 13, which reflect a greater 
weight on second-period decisions, depress 
both forms of investment. The x * results 
differ from those for situations of increasing 
regulatory stringency since the second-period 
penalty affects z1 as well as ql. This dif- 
ference arises because the firm no longer 
chooses z1 myopically but must make a per- 
manent quality investment commitment in 
period 1. This commitment is dependent on 
the penalty levels and capacity choices in 
both periods. Increases in the second-period 
x * boost the quality commitment z1. Unlike 
the situation of increasing regulatory strin- 
gency, there is no direct effect of x * on q, 
since the irreversibility contraint on capacity 
investments is not binding, as the firm will 
increase its output in period 2. Since z1 af- 
fects ql, however, there is an indirect effect 
of x * on q1. The higher zI values induced by 
increases in x* reduce the marginal regula- 
tory penalties on output, so that increases in 
x * also enhance the incentives for capacity 
investments. 
The parallels with the situation of increas- 
ing regulatory stringency are clearer if one 
views these policies in terms of departures 
from the initial policy x. The more x * is 
lowered below the initial penalty level, the 
more both q1 and z1 will be depressed. Simi- 
larly, the more x* exceeds x, the greater will 
be the reduction in ql. All shifts in regula- 
tory policy depress the initial output level. In 
the case of increasingly stringent regulations, 
it is because firms underinvest to avoid an 
irreversible commitment to a level of produc- 
tion that will subsequently be inefficiently 
large; in the case of regulations being relaxed 
it is the feedback effect of reduced quality 
investments that diminishes output. In- 
creasing the weight 18 on the second-period 
decisions always reduces both q1 and z, when 
there is a shift in regulatory policies. 
One might have expected that a known 
regulatory policy change would have in- 
fluenced only one of the two forms of irre- 
versible investment since a change in x will 
only make one of the first-period irreversibil- 
ity constraints binding. The actual impact is 
more pervasive due to the interdependence 
of the two types of investment when regula- 
tions are being relaxed. 
III. Uncertain Regulatory Policies 
While industries occasionally face a known 
schedule of regulatory changes, particularly 
when very stringent regulations are being 
phased in gradually, future shifts in the regu- 
latory policy are usually not specified in 
advance. This uncertainty is particularly great 
for regulations of hazards for which the 
available medical evidence is imprecise. The 
uncertainty regarding policy shifts, for any 
particular set of information, compounds 
these scientific uncertainties. If one assumes 
that firms are risk neutral, one might expect 
that the role of uncertainty could be treated 
using the results of Section II. After calculat- 
ing the expected penalty J- in period 2 and 
noting whether or not it involved a decrease 
or an increase in regulatory stringency, one 
might then apply the pertinent model for 
known regulatory changes. As the subse- 
quent results will indicate, such a relation- 
ship does not hold, as regulatory uncertain- 
ties introduce new complications into the 
firm's decisions and the policy design pro- 
cess. 
A. Implications for Firms' Decisions 
Suppose the firm is facing a binary policy 
lottery in period 2, where the penalty may 
rise to x* or fall to x*, where x* > x > x*. 
The situation in which one of the second- 
period penalties equals x poses no additional 
complications for the analysis below, but for 
concreteness I will assume that the strict 
inequalities hold. If both x* and x * equalled 
x, the analysis would be the same as in 
Section II. The firm assesses the probability 
9This requirement is that C'[Gj'ql -fBQ.(x *-G' ) 
+,#G"'Q]-(G' - x)2> 0, where Qz, = (x*- G')/C2'. 
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that x* will be the penalty as p and the 
probability that x* will be the penalty as 
(1 - p), and based on these expectations it is 
assumed to maximize discounted expected 
profits vT.10 
The decision in period 2 parallels the re- 
sults for the situation of certain policy 
changes. If x rises to x*, there will be no 
change in the output level since the firm 
cannot reduce output below its first-period 
level. The firm will, however, raise its quality 
investment Z2, which is given by Z(x*) and 
is defined by equation (5) as before. Simi- 
larly, reductions in x to x * lead the firm to 
make no change in its quality investment but 
provide an incentive to raise output to 
Q(x *, z1), which is implicitly defined by 
equation (9). From the standpoint of the 
second-period decisions, the uncertainty only 
affects q2 indirectly through its effect on z1. 
The first-period problem for the 
profit-maximizing firm is a variant on the 
earlier problems for the certainty case since 
the firm will 
Max7T = vql - C(qj)-qqG(zI )-xql (- zl) 
ql, z, 
+ [p [vql - C(qj )- qIG(Z)- x*ql (- Z)] 
+ (1-p)[vQ - C(Q)- QG(zl) 
- X*Q(l- Z)], 
producing the first-order conditions 
(13) ?Tq =O=v -Cj--GI-x(l-zl) 
+ 13p [v - C- G- x*(l - Z)]; 
(14) rz = 0 =-qG + xql 
+ (1l- p)[Q(- G' + x*)] . 
These conditions can be rewritten as 
(15) C= v 
GI + x(l-zl)+f3pG2 + fpx*(l-Z) 
I+ Rn 
(16)1 G' xql +, 3(1 - p)x*Q 
q1 +18(l-p)Q 
Unlike the results for the certainty situa- 
tion, neither of the first-period decisions takes 
the same form as with reversible investment 
decisions. Uncertainty affects both first- 
period decisions and does not hinge on the 
expected penalty x-. Rather, the choice of 
output ql, which will be increased if x de- 
creases and will remain the same if x rises to 
x*, is not directly affected by x *, but it is 
dependent on x*. The reason for this asym- 
metry is that the irreversibility constraint will 
only be binding if x* is the penalty so that 
only in this situation will q1 be the output 
level. As indicated by equation (15), the firm 
equates the marginal production cost with 
the price less the conditional expected costs 
associated with low quality, where this ex- 
pectation is restricted to the states in which 
qI is the output level. Equation (7) for the 
case of a certain increase in regulatory 
stringency is simply a special case of equa- 
tion (15), where the value of p equals one. 
The quality choice z1 also is affected by a 
conditional expectation, but here the firm 
sets the marginal cost of quality investments 
equal to the expected penalties weighted by 
the output levels, the probabilities, and the 
discount factor. Equation (16) represents a 
generalization of equation (12) for the case 
of decreasing regulatory stringency. It is not 
the expected penalty J- that influences deci- 
sions since the only second-period penalty 
value that enters is x *. The value of x* is 
irrelevant since a tighter penalty will lead the 
firm to augment its initial quality invest- 
ment, so that the first-period quality commit- 
ment will no longer be a binding constraint. 
With irreversibilities, the focus should not be 
on the expected penalties, but on the level of 
the regulatory policy in states in which the 
irreversibility constraint is binding. 
Equations (15) and (16) have unambigu- 
ous implications regarding the effect of fu- 
ture regulatory policy lotteries. Consider first 
the level of z1 when compared to the revers- 
'0The introduction of risk aversion would reinforce 
the nature of the findings below by creating additional 
incentives for underinvestment. 
" 'As in the certainty case, I assume that the second- 
order conditions are also fulfilled. 
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ible case. With myopic quality investments, 
the firm equates G' with x, but in the pres- 
ence of regulatory uncertainty, the marginal 
cost of quality investments is equated to the 
expression on the right side of equation (16), 
which is clearly less than x. If there is any 
nonzero probability that the penalty will be 
relaxed, firms facing regulatory uncertainty 
will underinvest in quality when compared 
with the myopic case. 
Uncertain regulatory policies will also lead 
to lower values of initial output if the right- 
hand side of equation (15) is below that in 
equation (2), a requirement hat reduces to 
(17) [Gj+x(l-zj)]+,8p[G2+x'(l-Z)] 
> [G + x(l-z)]+ftp[G + x(l-z)].- 
In the myopic case, the optimal z minimizes 
G + x(l - z), so that any effect of uncer- 
tainty on the z1 selected will raise these qual- 
ity-related costs in period 1. Except when 
1 - p equals zero (see equation (16)), there is 
always a distortion of the choice of z1. The 
first bracketed term on the left-hand side of 
equation (17) will exceed its counterpart on 
the right-hand side, except when p equals 1, 
in which case the two terms are equal. From 
equation (8) above we know that the second 
bracketed term on the left-hand side of equa- 
tion (17) exceeds the final term on the right- 
hand side except when there is no chance of 
a price increase (i.e., when p = 0). Uncertain 
regulatory policies will depress output pro- 
vided either there is a nonzero chance of a 
penalty increase or a nonzero chance of a 
penalty decrease. Any nontrivial regulatory 
policy lottery will depress output. 
Greater weight on the second-period out- 
comes in which the policy lottery occurs also 
have an adverse effect. Increasing the value 
of /3 has an unambiguous effect on q1 and zl. 
Total differentiation of equations (13) and 
(14) produces the result that aql /I8 < 0 and 
az I/ I/3 < 0, or greater weights on the period 
with uncertain regulatory policies will de- 
press both types of investment in period 1. 
Assessing the effects of changes in the 
lottery structure are more complicated since 
there are conflicting influences due to the 
complex interrelationships between q1 and 
z,. The direct effects of p on these variables 
are clear cut and, for the remainder of the 
paper, I will assume that these direct impacts 
are dominant.'2 Equivalently, I will focus on 
the effects of q, for fixed values of zl, which 
upon differentiation of equation (13) yield 
(18) 
dql p[IV- Cl-G2-X*(l -Z)] 
dp C<0 
This expression is negative since, as was 
shown in Section III.A, the unit cost of low 
quality G(Z)+x*(l-Z) is an increasing 
function of x*. Since the sum of the first- 
and second-period terms in equation (13) is 
zero, and since these quality-related terms 
represent the only difference between the 
two expressions, increasing q, must have a 
negative effect on the marginal profits result- 
ing in the second period. If this were not the 
case, the irreversibility constraint would not 
be binding since additional profits would be 
yielded by increasing output in period 2 when 
the penalty rose to x*. 
The probability p of a penalty increase 
also has an unambiguous direct effect on zl, 
for fixed values of ql, since 
dz, I3Q(-G' + x*) 
(19) I 9p> dp ITzIzI 
(since G' exceeds x*, see equation (16)). 
Increasing the chance of an increase in the 
regulatory penalty dampens the initial out- 
put level and raises the initial quality invest- 
ment. These results always hold if there is 
only one choice variable, or in situations in 
which there are competing effects, if the di- 
rect effects are dominant. 
12For example, in the case of dql/dp the value 
obtained when effects through both choice variables are 
considered is negative except for the presence of a term 
jQQ(- G'+ x)(G'- x*) generated by the indirect effect 
of p on q1 through z1 that is positive since, from 
equation (16), we have x > G' > x *. The underinvest- 
ment in quality increases the expected regulatory penal- 
ties on capacity investments, leading to a possible rever- 
sal in the dqI /dp result if this effect is large. 
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B. The Effect on Profits and the Value 
of Information 
Since regulatory uncertainty alters enter- 
prise decisions in a manner that is quite 
different from what would result if penalties 
in each period were equated to their expected 
levels, profits will also be affected. If the 
regulatory penalty x fully reflects the value 
of the quality component to society, the value 
of profits will equal the net surplus to society 
and can serve as an economic efficiency mea- 
sure. To analyze the implications for firms' 
profitability, let us introduce the notation * 
to denote the present value of r obtained 
over both periods when the firm selects its 
choice variables optimally. The analogous 
values in period 2 will be *2(x*) for 
second-period profits if x* is the penalty and 
2 (x*) after the penalty lottery has resulted 
in x*. 
The value of * depends on p directly and 
through its influence on the choice variables 
q,(p) and z,(p), which in turn affects 
Q(x *, zl). When differentiating * with re- 
spect to p, all terms involving dql/ap and 
dz,/dp will drop out (by the envelope theo- 
rem) since the investment levels will be cho- 
sen optimally in response to changes in any 
parameter such as p. The effect of p on 
profits is consequently given by 
ad/dp = I [*2(x*) -*2(x*)] < 0, 
since profits are lower in the state with a 
higher regulatory penalty (i.e., *2(x*) is be- 
low *2(x*)). Increasing the chance that the 
regulatory penalty will rise reduces the dis- 
counted expected profits, as one might ex- 
pect. The second derivative of the profit 
function indicates the curvature of this rela- 
tionship, where 
d2'fi/dp2 =13(dql/dp)[v - Cl-G 
-x*(l - Z)] +/ az' Q(GI - x*) > , 
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FIGURE 1. THE EFFECT OF REGULATORY 
UNCERTAINTY ON PROFITS 
The function * is sketched in Figure 1. 
The two endpoints of the curve are the prof- 
its * * with a certain drop in the penalty to 
x * and the profits ** with a certain increase 
in the penalty. The weighted average of these 
points is the dashed line that lies above the * 
curve. From Jensen's Inequality, we have the 
result that p* *+(l-p)`** exceeds *(J-), 
where these values are indicated on the dia- 
gram for one possible value of p, denoted by 
p. The firm facing an uncertain regulatory 
policy lottery (p, x*; 1- p, x*) will make 
lower profits than if it faced the penalty 
px * + (I -p) x * with certainty. 
A related issue is how the size of this loss 
is affected by the value of p. In particular, 
what is the expected value of perfect infor- 
mation EVPI regarding the future regulatory 
policy or, viewed somewhat differently, what 
is the minimal value of the expected oppor- 
tunity loss that will be incurred? The EVPI 
value is simply the gap between the two 
curves in Figure 1, or 
EVPI = p** *+(1-p) *- ,* 
13The direction of this inequality can be easily veri- 
fied. As noted above, the value of the derivative of 
second-period profits with respect to q, is negative since 
the irreversibility constraint is binding so the bracketed 
term is negative. From equation (16), G' exceeds x*, 
and the signs of cq/clp and 9z/clp are negative and 
positive, respectively, assuming the direct effects of p are 
dominant. 
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The gap will reach its widest amount at 
some interior value of p. The effect of p on 
EVPI is given by 
dEVPI/dp = (X* - *)- aT/dp. 
For small values of p, this expression is 
positive since the slope of the profit function 
vr is steeper than the weighted average curve. 
The losses due to uncertainty are greatest 
when dar/dp equals (Xir* - T*), which is the 
slope of the weighted average curve, and 
EVPI decreases thereafter. The point s in 
Figure 1 represents the p value at which 
maximum efficiency losses occur; s need only 
be some interior point and is not necessarily 
1/2. 
One would expect that a firm's profits 
would be decreasing with respect to p wholly 
apart from any losses from uncertainty since 
higher regulatory penalties increase its costs. 
The more interesting result is that uncertain 
regulatory policies impose additional oppor- 
tunity losses as firms are discouraged from 
making irreversible investment commit- 
ments. These losses are greatest when the 
lottery on regulatory penalties involves an 
intermediate p value rather than an extreme 
probability close to zero or one. 
IV. Conclusion 
Three separate effects of regulatory poli- 
cies on enterprise decisions can be dis- 
tinguished. First, increased regulatory penal- 
ties will diminish output and profits in static 
models or, equivalently, in multiperiod mod- 
els in which investments are completely re- 
versible, as is well known. Second, if invest- 
ment commitments are irreversible, there will 
be an additional effect of a known schedule 
of changes in the regulatory policy, which 
will depress output even further. Finally, the 
addition of uncertainty with regard to regu- 
latory policy produces a third effect resulting 
in expected opportunity losses for firms. Both 
output and quality investments will be de- 
pressed by regulatory policy lotteries. Regu- 
lations influence current enterprise decisions 
not only through their current level, but 
through their expected future level and the 
degree of uncertainty regarding these future 
regulatory policies. 
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